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ABSTRACT: With increasing publication and data production, scientific knowledge presents not sim-
ply an achievement but also a challenge. Scientific publications and data are increasingly treated as re-
sources that need to be digitally ‘managed.’ This gives rise to scientific Knowledge Management (KM): 
second-order scientific work aiming to systematically collect, take care of and mobilise first-hand discipli-
nary knowledge and data in order to provide new first-order scientific knowledge. We follow the work of 
Leonelli (2014, 2016), Efstathiou (2012, 2016) and Hislop (2013) in our analysis of the use of KM in se-
mantic systems biology. Through an empirical philosophical account of KM-enabled biological research, 
we argue that KM helps produce new first-order biological knowledge that did not exist before, and 
which could not have been produced by traditional means. KM work is enabled by conceiving of ‘knowl-
edge’ as an object for computational science: as explicated in the text of biological articles and computable 
via appropriate data and metadata. However, these founded knowledge concepts enabling computational 
KM risk focusing on only computationally tractable data as knowledge, underestimating practice-based 
knowing and its significance in ensuring the validity of ‘manageable’ knowledge as knowledge. 
KEYWORDS: Knowledge Management, systems biology, cellular signalling networks, knowledge con-
cepts, objectivist epistemology, practice-based epistemology, founded concepts
RESUMEN: Con el aumento de la publicación y la producción de datos, el conocimiento científico no solo es re-
conocido como un logro, sino también como un desafío. Las publicaciones y los datos científicos se tratan cada vez 
más como recursos que deben ser ‘gestionados’ digitalmente. Esto da lugar a la Gestión del Conocimiento científico 
(Knowledge Management (KM)): labor científica de segundo orden destinada a recopilar, cuidar y movilizar 
de forma directa el conocimiento disciplinario de primera mano y los datos para proporcionar nuevos conocimien-
tos científicos de primer orden. Seguimos el trabajo de Leonelli (2014, 2016), Efstathiou (2012, 2016) y Hislop 
(2013) en nuestro análisis del uso de la KM en la biología de sistemas semánticos. A través de una descripción filosó-
fica empírica de la investigación biológica habilitada para KM, argumentamos que KM ayuda a producir un nuevo 
conocimiento biológico de primer orden que no existía antes y que no podría haber sido producido por medios tra-
dicionales. El trabajo de KM está facultado para concebir el “conocimiento” como un objeto para la ciencia compu-
tacional: como algo explicitado en el texto de artículos biológicos y como computable a través de datos y metadatos 
apropiados. Sin embargo, los conceptos fundados permiten el riesgo computacional de KM de centrarse solo en los da-
tos que se pueden tratar de manera computacional como conocimiento, subestimando el conocimiento basado en la 
práctica y su importancia para garantizar la validez del conocimiento “manejable” como conocimiento.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Gestión del conocimiento, biología de sistemas, redes de señalización celular, concep-
tos de conocimiento, epistemología objetivista, epistemología basada en la práctica, conceptos fundados.
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Introduction
Scientific knowledge in the 21st century is not only an achievement but increasingly a chal-
lenge. What looks like a great resource—so many publications, so much data—is only a re-
source if one can manage to manage it—or so scientific Knowledge Management practices 
propose. The last few decades have witnessed the growth of a meta-level of scientific work: 
“Knowledge Management” (KM) develops second-order scientific work, geared to col-
lect, take care of and discover first-order scientific knowledge and data, by computational 
means. How does current second-order KM shape first order scientific knowledge? We an-
swer by considering the case of KM-enabled systems biology. 
We expand on the work of Sabina Leonelli on data-centric biology (2014, 2016), So-
phia Efstathiou on technical, founded concepts (2012, 2016) and Donald Hislop on or-
ganisational Knowledge Management (2013) to argue that, in the case of systems biology, 
scientific KM is helping to produce new first-order biological knowledge that did not ex-
ist before, and which could not have been produced by traditional means. This happens by 
conceiving of ‘knowledge’1 as an object for computational science: as explicated in written 
text and rendered computable via data and appropriate metadata. However, the founded 
concepts enabling computational KM come at a cost. They risk focusing on only compu-
tationally tractable data as knowledge, underestimating practice-based knowing and its sig-
nificance in ensuring the validity of ‘manageable’ knowledge. We conclude by reflecting on 
what a practice-based epistemology in KM would imply, looking to organisational Knowl-
edge Management theory as a guide.
Our thesis derives from joint work among philosophers, biologists and bioinformati-
cians at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). Our work was 
funded as an “integrated” interdisciplinary project to investigate Ethical, Legal and So-
cial Aspects of systems biology (cf. similar work in Stegmaier 2009; Rabinow and Ben-
nett 2009; Leonelli 2010. Our own approach is outlined in Nydal et al. 2012). From Sep-
tember 2011 to December 2014, the co-authors worked through monthly meetings, the 
18-month embedded research of Efstathiou in the lab of Lægreid, co-authorship, text-
based reflection and discussion, joint international research trips and conference organ-
isation. Philosophical research used empirical qualitative methods including participant 
observation, in-depth interviews with fourteen scientists, six of which directly inform this 
paper, as well as several informal interviews, analyses of scientific texts and of our own 
co-authored texts (cf. Wagenknecht et al. 2015; Van der Burg and Swierstra 2013). While 
accepting that some critical interests of socio-humanists can become troubled and trouble 
the frame of a shared research project (Balmer et al. 2015), we argue in form and message 
for practice-based, integrated work as a means to understand scientific knowledge produc-
tion in the 21st century. 
Our paper has three main sections. Section 1 outlines scientific KM and its tools, as 
second-order scientific work in biology, operating on first-order biological knowledge. Sec-
tion 2 illustrates the development of new first-order biological knowledge through sec-
1 We use double quotes to mark “words”, single for ‘concepts’ and no quotes for the things they refer 
to/pick out. Double quotes can also function as “scare-quotes” to mark concepts in need of further 
analysis. 
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ond-order KM tools: building a “knowledge assembly” model within the field of systems 
biology. We reflect on the founded knowledge concepts and epistemologies that drive com-
putational KM in Section 3.
1.  Knowledge as a Challenge: Second-order computational Knowledge Management in the 
life sciences 
Derek J. de Solla Price—famous for his idea of ‘big’ science—reached his conclusion using 
the rate of scientific publication as a proxy for the growth of science (Price 1961, 1963). 
The growth of scientific publication is today emerging as a scientific challenge itself. Publi-
cation is growing at exponential rates across traditional outlets like journals, and new out-
lets like open archives, proceedings and home pages, with databases archiving this infor-
mation struggling to keep up (Larsen and von Ins 2010, 576-600). Digital data has now 
inherited the sceptre of ‘bigness’ from science: in 2013, 90% of the world’s data had been 
produced in the last two years (SINTEF 2013). Big data includes data produced by scien-
tific activities, such as high-energy (big) physics, but also and importantly the digital foot-
prints of personal and professional lives lived online. Data science is an emerging catch field 
devising new ways to learn from such digital data (cf. the term’s first usage by Cleveland 
2001). These new approaches to knowing through publications and data are heavily reli-
ant on computational, quantitative methods and statistical analysis. However, the study 
of knowledge as a usable resource developed first as a field in the social sciences, as a part of 
business management and organisation studies. 
Knowledge Management (KM) became a focus for organisation studies roughly in 
the mid 1990s, at the same time as the Internet was becoming popularised and computers 
cheaper (Hislop 2013). The general focus of organisational KM was how to take care of the 
knowledge of a corporation: this included developing theoretical understandings of what 
‘knowledge’ is for/in organisations and ways to cultivate, share or otherwise capitalise on 
this kind of resource. Organisational KM thus spanned epistemological theoretical work, 
qualitative social science methods such as organisational ethnography, and technically ori-
ented sub-fields, such as utilising Information and Communication Technologies to retain, 
analyse or share employees’ knowledge, in their absence. Though Organisational KM is not 
a standalone discipline, it is pursued using different disciplinary approaches. 
In life science, KM is synonymous to this last type of computational or digital KM. 
Its methods are more akin to computer science and informatics ones than to social science 
ones, focusing on the computational management of scientific knowledge. Humans are 
crucial participants in KM, yet the recruitment of computers is an organising goal. Con-
sider some standard tools developed for second-order KM work on bioscience knowledge 
(Antezana et al. 2009, 393-394). 
— Knowledge Representation (KR) languages: These are formalisms aimed to repre-
sent real-world entities and the relationships between them through abstraction, 
in the form of logical statements that are computationally comprehensible. KR 
languages provide “commitments” for how to observe a domain and how to rea-
son over it. Formal KR helps structure communications between different com-
puter systems to avoid ambiguity, for instance when collecting and sharing data. 
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For such “interoperability”, systems need to adopt a shared syntax (a way of pars-
ing entities) and a means of understanding semantics (the assigned meaning) as-
sociated with the syntax.
— Ontologies: Ontologies can be imagined as taxonomies of what “exists”—really, if 
one is a realist, or specifically for a particular domain following more pragmatic, 
pluralist or anti-realist approaches (Chalmers 2009; Lord and Stevens 2010).2 In 
biology, “bioontologies” are built to be amenable to computational usage: they are 
structured through prescribed relations between entities, for example “is_a” or 
“part _of”, using KR languages. They may be understood as vocabularies with a spec-
ification of intended meaning, or as “controlled vocabularies” plus relations. Ontol-
ogies may be formal, using description logics, or non-formal, when describing mean-
ing in ‘natural’ language. 
— Ontologies are populated with information through curation or biocuration. Cura-
tion involves “extracting knowledge” from text and is done usually “manually”, i.e. 
by people (Antezana et  al. 2009, 394). Biocurators are biology experts engaged in 
reading the published biological literature and to translate key findings in the sci-
entific literature to annotations of biological entities using expressions composed of 
terms provided by controlled vocabularies and ontologies, which can then be han-
dled by KR models. Biocurators currently do most of the difficult and uncertain 
“interpretation” of text (Efstathiou field notes, European Bioinformatics Institute 
visit -February 6-8, 2013; Leonelli 2014). Biocurators are also often female, em-
ployed temporarily, and undervalued (cf. Gabrielsen 2018). Even though demand 
for biocuration is huge, biologists are not motivated to pursue this work as it is con-
sidered less innovative.3 KM tools are being developed for biocurators to semi-auto-
mate information-mining and information-entry—though the prospects of fully re-
placing humans here is highly unlikely. 
— The Semantic Web is envisioned as a next generation web that will help comput-
ers “interpret” online content. This interpretation will happen, roughly speaking, 
through extra layers of information. For instance, while reading a Wikipedia article 
on “cells” you will know from the discursive context whether these are prison cells 
or eukaryotic cells. A layer of meta-data can make this distinction clear to a com-
puter, for instance by identifying terms through Internationalised Resource Iden-
tifiers (IRIs). This is like teaching someone a language by pointing: prison “cell” 
would be hooked onto a different IRI than biological “cell”; and so too with terms 
for relations, processes, conjunctions, etc. Standard information exchange languages 
HTML and XML have already been extended to support semantics within sci-
entific domains, e.g. the Systems Biology Markup Language SBML (Hucka et  al. 
2003). The simplest semantic KR language for information exchange is the Re-
2 Barry Smith has been an influential philosopher, producing a realist Aristotelian ontology. Nicholson 
and Dupré (2018) collect views on a process-based understanding of biology, including how this may 
impact bioontologies. 
3 Goble and Stevens (2008) report that John Quackenbush describes standards as ‘‘blue collar science” adding 
that “No-one will win a Nobel Prize for defining a workable format standard” (688). See also the compelling 
piece of Goble and Wroe (2004): This compares life scientists’ and computer scientists’ ‘feud’ to that be-
tween the Montagues and the Capulets in Romeo and Juliet, ; that is, as a feud blocking a great romance.
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source Description Framework (RDF), which uses triples, of the form “(subject, 
predicate, object)”, to represent information (Antezana et  al. 2009, 397). Ontol-
ogy languages can structure RDF further, and enable operations on them (cf. RDF 
Schema RDFS, or Web Ontology Language OWL).4
Scientific KM infrastructures are being developed through work upstream—by authors 
sharing “knowledge” through standardised formats, downstream—by curators and data-
base managers who extract and store “knowledge” using KM tools, and midstream—by 
scientists sourcing and analysing “knowledge” from online resources. Imposing standards 
on scientific knowledge production aims to align second-order KM infrastructures with 
first-order knowledge production to “enhance”—make more precise, faster, larger-scale- 
the production of knowledge on the first-order (cf. recently Wilkinson et  al. 2016; Ed-
wards et al. 2007). 
Why not just see KM as a tool for science, instead of a scientific research field itself? 
Scientific KM deserves the name ‘science’, as it promises to enable new first-order knowl-
edge: it combines knowledge from information science and statistics with knowledge of a 
target epistemic domain’s native epistemic standards to ensure that first-order knowledge 
and data are managed in ways that can ensure their validity, relevance and ethos. Certainly, 
second-order KM relies on first-order knowledge for its existence—there must be some 
kind of ‘knowledge’ there to manage. Yet scientific KM is developing science (biology, his-
tory, economics, …) on a meta-level, through codifying and managing first-order scientific 
activity explicitly and systematically. In this mode, KM-enabled science is like a snake bit-
ing its own tail, seeking to grow by re-sourcing its ‘own’ scientific activity in new, scientific, 
digitally mediated ways. 
But is scientific growth possible this way? How can second-order KM add to first-or-
der knowledge? We explore this question through a case and example.
2. Scientific Knowledge Management producing first-order biological knowledge
To illustrate the work of scientific KM and its impact we examine KM in the field of sys-
tems biology. As mentioned, our work is based on empirical, philosophical research. 
Over the course of January 2012 to September 2013 Efstathiou participated daily in 
the work environment of Lægreid’s lab, sharing office space with project members, attend-
ing and presenting in lab meetings, and following computational modeling work while also 
observing animal modeling in another lab (cf. Efstathiou 2018, 2019). Participation in-
cluded observing people in their work environment and interviewing them, formally and 
informally, that is, using structured and unstructured interview formats. For this article we 
draw on six in-depth interviews pursued by Efstathiou, including with Lægreid and Kui-
per and completed in the Spring and Fall of 2012, three of which are quoted here. Besides 
co-authors, one of our interviewees, ‘Luke’, has been a key informant, offering opportuni-
ties for several informal interviews in the period of the project. 
4 Such digital KM tools are also being developed for other fields, such as archaeology and the 
humanities, but our focus here is bioscience.
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Our qualitative analysis of interview material focused on the use of the term “knowl-
edge”, and “knowing”. We coded for different uses of this term, identifying manifest and 
operative concepts of knowledge in these domains (Haslanger 2005), i.e. definitions of 
knowledge in KM textbooks, and what conceptions of knowledge are “founded” and op-
erative in getting KM work done (Haslanger 2005; Efstathiou 2012). Our focus was the 
practical wielding of the word “knowledge”: How do KM researchers apply in practice, in 
bodily practice, the term “knowledge”? We put special attention on whether usage varied 
across disciplines. 
In articulating a logic in the social practice of computational KM we claim that re-
searchers operate with a sense of “knowledge” that locates it in the actual text of articles, 
as explicated facts and information, and further as arising from appropriately annotated 
data and metadata. This practice provides a way of working with knowledge as a thing, a 
resource to be extracted and organized from texts via the help of computers making new 
results possible. What our method does not support is a claim about what all or most 
KM researchers think. Rather, what we are communicating to the reader is one kind 
of social practice of knowledge and new conceptions of knowledge that emerge from 
this material, and which may apply elsewhere. Finally we choose to illustrate these ideas 
through our empirical material and organizational KM theory instead of starting with 
epistemological discussions in philosophy, as our focus are situated linguistic-embodied 
practices specific to KM. 
We dub the group led by Lægreid the GAstrin BIology group, or GABI, and the group 
led by Kuiper as the SEmantic Systems Biology group, or SEB. The size of the groups is 
comparable, and has varied in this period between 5 to 10 members. GABI members are 
primarily trained in molecular biology, and lab-bench science. SEB members rely primarily 
on computational training, though several have a mixed background including biology. We 
use gendered acronyms to signal the gender balance in these groups. At the time of writ-
ing GABI is led by and includes a majority of scientists who identify as female, while SEB 
is led by and includes almost exclusively scientists who identify as male, with women in 
junior positions—profiles typical of respectively molecular biology and computer science 
work. Both groups include international members, though SEB is significantly more inter-
national. Using KM capabilities, GABI and SEB members are working to understand how 
mammalian cells respond to stimulation by the hormone gastrin. They are doing so within 
the frame of systems biology. 
2.1. Systems biology and KM
Systems biology is a bioscience approach that has flourished in the paradigm of genomics 
(Powell et al. 2009; Keller 2005). The completion of the Human Genome Project in the 
early 2000s made clear that genes cannot account for biological complexity5, and produced 
tools for sourcing more and more—omics data in need of accounting for (Blake and Bult 
2006). From a field of experimental science purporting itself to be too complex to admit 
mathematical formalisation, biology is now arguably too complex not to try (Green 2017). 
5 A typical human-centric and gene-centric way to capture missing information is to compare the HGP find-
ings on the genome of humans estimated at 30K genes with the weed Arabidopsis that counts 26K genes. 
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Systems biology factors into the study of biology some of the complexity, multi-layered-
ness and multi-causality that biological systems seem to have by combining molecular biol-
ogy with methods from mathematics, physics and computer science. It negotiates contrast-
ing commitments to abstraction among these epistemic communities (Keller 2002) to help 
understand biological systems as multi-composed and dynamic (Calvert 2010; Calvert and 
Fujimura 2011). 
Computational tools are becoming crucial for the study of multi-component biologi-
cal systems. The systems biology of a few components has been pursued for decades (Keller 
2002; Peter and Davidson 2012) but approaches building on large-scale—omics data 
emerged only in the new century (Boogerd et  al. 2007; Green and Wolkenhauer 2013). 
Computation is considered crucial for mathematical simulation and reasoning about large-
scale systems, and for managing knowledge about hundreds of components at the same 
time. 
But how is “knowledge” understood within KM-enabled biological practice? We can-
not answer that question in general, but we consider some accounts by SEB researchers. 
2.2. “Knowledge” in a semantic systems biology context
The review used earlier to map key tools in the field of scientific KM is co-authored by SEB 
members. Here is how the authors manifestly define knowledge:
The concept of data came into prominence relatively recently, mainly due to the widespread 
use of the information and communication technologies (ICT) and the advent of modern empir-
ical technologies that outpour huge amounts of data. Data should not be confused with knowl-
edge—the former is just a collection of facts that require interpretation in order to be converted 
into knowledge. Thus, knowledge is data plus an interpretation of its meaning (Antezana et al. 
2009, 392; emphasis added). 
“Knowledge” is here juxtaposed to “data” and readers are warned against confusing the 
two. Knowledge can only be derived from an “interpretation” of the meaning of data. 
What does this involve? Not any interpretation goes!
We often need to specify the meaning of a word by attending to its use-context. If data 
are numbers or labels, knowledge is similarly described as possible to obtain by supplement-
ing data with context. 
To give an example, consider the output of a microarray experiment. This is pure data, a ma-
trix of labels and numbers that conveys no meaning to the human mind. A subsequent analysis 
of the data may reveal that a certain group of genes is over-expressed under certain conditions; 
if this finding would be based on experimental evidence obtained through accepted analysis ap-
proaches and have statistical significance, this would comply with the conditions above and con-
stitute a piece of knowledge. Obviously, the same set of data may afford many alternative inter-
pretations. Therefore, the concept of ‘provenance’, keeping track of how pieces of knowledge 
came to be, is crucial for KM. (Antezana et al. 2009, 392-393; emphasis added).
Providing context happens by specifying data provenance. This is an epistemologically 
thick concept as it is meant to keep track of the experimental analysis approaches used 
to derive the data. Data provenance is understood to provide evidence and thus to help 
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choose a valid data interpretation and to convert data into “pieces of knowledge”—note 
the metaphorical parsing of knowledge into bits. This in effect involves handling extra data 
about the data, or ‘metadata’, for instance when the data in question were obtained, by 
what experimental procedure, on what material: 
Numbers themselves [data] are meaningless, but knowing that the column with numbers de-
picts quantified fluorescence from a microarray experiment done on a breast tumour RNA ex-
tract allows one to interpret these as proxies for gene activity, if one also knows that each row 
represents one specific gene. (Comment on text, 12.10.14; emphasis added).
Knowledge is conceived as interpreted, or contextualised data (numbers or facts), where 
the contextualisation happens via the provision of metadata that help specify the prove-
nance of these data to convert them into knowledge. How particular is this understanding 
of knowledge to SEB members?
In 2007 Chaim Zins published a Critical Delphi study of 150 information scien-
tists specifically to analyze their definition of “three key concepts” (497): data, infor-
mation and knowledge. Zins (2007) reports that in their majority responses conceived 
of “knowledge” as ‘nonmetaphysical’, i.e. as accessible to epistemic scrutiny, as ‘cogni-
tive-based’, i.e. concerning states of mind, or meaning and intention, as ‘propositional’, 
i.e. as distinct from practical knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance, and last as ‘hu-
man-centered’, i.e. as pertaining to humans as opposed to other systems (487-488). The 
majority of respondents further agreed that data, information and knowledge are part of 
a continuum, where “data are the raw material for information, and information is the 
raw material for knowledge” (Zins 2007, 497; the existence of a Wikipedia entry on the 
“DIKW ‘pyramid’ of Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom” further indicates the 
typicality of this notion). 
The manifest concept of knowledge defined among SEB members seems to agree with 
results in Zins (2007): knowledge is perceived as accessible to epistemic scrutiny, delivered 
by epistemic work, such as providing context to data, and as cognitive-based, “the interpre-
tation of meaning”, instead of by smelling, touching or being with data. Even if bioinfor-
maticians tacitly know how to handle data, the definition of knowledge they work with is 
of it as a cognitive, intellectual output. However there is a point at which SEB members di-
verge from the results of Zins (2007). 
SEB develop computational, semantic approaches to KM, using the developing Seman-
tic Web. In this context, “knowledge” is not understood as human-centered, as Zins (2007) 
claims, but as accessible by and communicable among computers. 
Traditionally, the interpretation [of the meaning of data] was carried out by a human being; 
however, today the interpretation of large-scale data sets is typically only possible with the help 
of computers because of the sheer volume of data. … KM is the process of systematically captur-
ing, structuring, retaining and reusing information to develop an understanding of how a par-
ticular system (e.g. an organelle or a pathway) works, and subsequently to convey this informa-
tion meaningfully to other information systems (knowledge distribution). (Antezana et al. 2009, 
392, 393; emphasis added).
In this case, knowledge derived from large-scale data is described as “only possible with the 
help of computers”, and further, as possible to “distribute” to other information systems. 
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Knowledge is thus not understood as “human-centered” but as possible and exchangeable, 
at times only, via computational means. This could be a matter of SEB’s research focus, it 
may track changing perceptions in information science, or it might be that everyday and 
technical concepts of knowledge are not well kept apart in the inquiry. 
2.3. Founded knowledge concepts 
Ideas about knowledge appear here as “founded” in the epistemic practice of computa-
tional KM. Founded concepts are defined by Sophia Efstathiou as “transfigurations” of 
everyday ideas, following operations that gear them to work as technical, scientific concepts 
(2012, 2016). Founding a concept in a scientific domain happens through actions that can 
seem natural to practitioners, like (Efstathiou 2016, 53): 
— focusing the concept on an ontological domain of interest
— expressing a concept in terms ‘native’ to a scientific domain 
— operationalizing or devising ways to measure a concept 
— discussing or publishing about this concept with colleagues. 
Founding is “done” when the original idea is possible to find within the scientific do-
main as a scientific concept. Efstathiou calls the result “found science” by analogy to 
found art. 
It appears that “knowledge” operates as a technical, founded concept in KM work: 
it re-articulates an everyday idea of knowledge to fit the epistemic cultures of computa-
tional science. To track how founding could happen here consider a manifest definition of 
an everyday idea of knowledge sourced from the Oxford English Dictionary6. Two main 
meanings of ‘knowledge’, ordinarily understood, are specified there: 
— Facts, information and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoret-
ical or practical understanding of a subject—e.g. I have good knowledge of gram-
mar. 
— Awareness or familiarity gained by experience—e.g. Sílvia’s knowledge of human 
nature is remarkable—she can always read people. 
Following this definition we can say that, manifestly, knowledge is ordinarily understood 
to involve learning facts, information or skills through education, or developing familiarity 
and awareness through personal experience.
We here propose that founding “knowledge” as a technical idea within KM happens 
by focusing on the ontological domain of facts and information, i.e. on knowledge as a phe-
nomenon concerning the theoretical and practical understanding of a topic. This narrows 
the ontological scope of the everyday idea, to exclude informal, experiential and personal 
dimensions of knowledge. The concept becomes honed into those aspects of knowledge 
that are relevant for information science: knowledge then is, in this domain, facts and in-
formation. This specification allows a concept of knowledge to be further founded within 
computational KM by translating ‘facts and information’ in terms native to computer sci-
6 The definition is available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/knowledge
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ence like ‘data’, ‘metadata’ and ‘provenance’, which allows the concept to be further oper-
ationalized via appropriate Knowledge Representations, ontologies and relevant syntax/se-
mantics. 
These two founded technical concepts: explicated knowledge (facts and information in 
the scientific literature) and computable knowledge (appropriately derived data and meta-
data) allow KM researchers to approach knowledge as (always already) a computational 
phenomenon. What power can founded concepts of knowledge afford working biologists? 
Consider a perspective from collaborators in SEB. 
SEB member ‘Ari’ worked in conservation biology in India before his Masters in Bi-
oinformatics (Interview, 3.10.12). Ari realised how important “handling data” is, while 
in the field. He worked with big fruit-eating bats, a specialist population feeding and liv-
ing in only specific habitats, (like he is, he jokes, as a vegetarian in Scandinavia), and was 
also involved in a behavioural study of arachnids (spiders) “as big as my palm” (Interview, 
3.10.12). Ari recalls that different research groups in the same research community of-
ten used different guidelines making it difficult for data from one institute to fit another’s 
standards. He recalls how challenging it was to get from local to national data on the same 
species, especially to combine data from the North and South of India: “The North-South 
divide in India is sharp -in culture.” (Interview, 3.10.12). Coming to his current work in se-
mantic systems biology Ari explains:
It is part of human nature: we are ambiguous in the way we say things. Semantic Web con-
nects data unambiguously and meaningfully, with meaning attached to context so that they can 
be changed or agreed upon. (Interview, 3.10.12; emphasis added).
How can Semantic Web technologies help humans communicate, “unambiguously” and 
“meaningfully” here?
The larger mission of Semantic Web is to convert stuff to entity-based content. So for 
example, when you say “Sophia”, it should present YOU. “Sophia is—a person”, “is—a bio-
logical entity”, “is—a woman”, “is-part-of-the Crossover Research group”; these would be dif-
ferent relations built into the knowledgebase to identify YOU. (Interview, 3.10.12; emphases 
added).
Changing data and agreeing on data, as biologists need to do, is to be mediated and facili-
tated by making data unambiguous and ‘known’ first for computers and networks of com-
puters. The context where biological data would be given meaning is, in this case, a mixed 
biological and semantic web context, where “knowing” involves properly identifying things 
and relating them to other identified things, through identified relations. 
This is a founded concept of knowledge as computable, from data plus appropriate 
metadata, which is markedly foreign to biological practice. The concept seems possible 
to smuggle into first-order biological practice, through a prior founding of ‘knowledge’ as 
facts and information explicated in published texts. 
The next section illustrates how founded technical concepts of knowledge as explicated 
and computable facilitate KM practices: they aid KM in deriving new first-order biological 
knowledge, in new ways. 
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2.4.  KM impacting first-order biological knowledge:  
Assembling “knowledge” into a model 
Consider a central question in GABI research: 
— What happens to a cell when it is stimulated by the hormone gastrin? 
Gastrin is released in the gastric mucosa, the lining of digestive organs, and it contributes to 
physiological processes like digestion, appetite control and body weight regulation. It is also 
associated with several diseases including cancer. GABI researchers are interested in how 
the CholeCystoKinin 2 cellular Receptor (referred to as “CCKR” among researchers) me-
diates these responses from inside the body to cell nuclei and genomes. GABI have pursued 
wet-lab and increasingly KM-based research to answer their central question. 
Figure 1
Drawing developed by GABI members to represent gastrin-mediated signalling and 
regulation of gene expression. The hormone gastrin interacts with its specific CCK2 receptor, 
which transduces the gastrin signal through the cell membrane (curved line), and via signalling 
pathways (diamonds on rectangles) and gene expression regulators (hexagons) down to gene 
activities (ovals). [Pulled from Lægreid’s presentation slides.]
To better understand what happens inside mammalian cells stimulated by gastrin (Figure 1), 
the molecular biologist and GABI member ‘Luke’ collected “published knowledge” about all 
cellular components (genes, proteins, RNAs, metabolites) described to respond to gastrin in 
different experimental systems (different mammalian cell lines, from different organisms, at 
different conditions) (field notes, September 2012). Luke created a “knowledge assembly” 
model, operating with assumptions about the extractability and compose-ability of biological 
“knowledge”, across experimental contexts (Tripathi et al. 2015). In publications the model 
is referred to as a “signalling network” and “signalling map” primarily, instead of a “knowl-
edge assembly” model, which was how the model was described in conversation. The epithet 
“knowledge-assembly” makes clear the second-order application of KM tools in building the 
model. Calling the model a “signalling network” or “map” points instead to the first-order bi-
ological target under model representation: cellular signalling processes. 
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Figure 2
CellDesigner model on screen (left), and in print (right). The model encompasses a total of 
530 proteins and genes (various shapes) linked by 413 interactions (lines). The entity names are 
hyperlinked to standard bioontologies and databases, and causal regulatory information is connected to 
PubMed IDs of the scientific articles from which the information was collected (Tripathi et al. 2015). 
Central to representing this “knowledge” is the pathway-editing software CellDesign-
erTM (Funahashi et  al. 2003; Kitano 2003) (Figure 2). CellDesigner was created in Hi-
roaki Kitano’s laboratory at Tokyo University (Available online at http://celldesigner.
org/). Kitano is one of the people leading the current computationally heavy and se-
mantically integrated vision of systems biology (cf. Kitano 2002). Why should biologists 
use this tool? Kitano expresses the need to have computationally ‘structured’ visual rep-
resentations for molecular, gene or protein networks and interactions as follows (2003):
Currently knowledge on molecular interactions is mostly described either by written text or by 
traditional cartoon-like diagrams. Written text is inherently ambiguous, and results have had to be 
re-interpreted by each reader of the article. Most authors of biological papers use arrow-headed lines 
to indicate activation and inhibition, respectively, with mixed and often inconsistent semantics. 
However, traditional diagrams are informal, often confusing, and much information is lost. Thus 
the urgent task is to provide a set of notations that have powerful expression capability and are 
highly readable for biochemical and gene regulatory networks (169, emphasis added).
Kitano’s argument echoes Ari’s remarks: standard biological communication through 
text and diagrams is “ambiguous”. How is published knowledge “disambiguated” by 
CellDesigner? By providing standardised formats for its representation and by thereby 
fixing rules for its interpretation. The shapes, or “glyphs” used by CellDesigner are 
generally accepted as a standard for the visual representation of biological networks, 
known as Systems Biology Graphical Notation (SBGN—Le Novère et al. 2009). Cell-
Designer enables a computational simulation of biological ‘knowledge’, understood 
here as facts and information described by written text and diagrams in the literature. 
CellDesigner uses the KR language generally accepted for such simulations, Systems 
Biology Markup Language (SBML—Hucka et al. 2003). The representational choices 
offered by CellDesigner look similar to how biologists would “anyway” draw diagrams, 
yet CellDesigner enables the computational comparison, compilation and sharing of 
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these models, and the further interpretation of ‘knowledge’ explicated and made com-
putable in them. 
CellDesigner helps manage textually explicated knowledge by hosting it in computa-
tionally manageable, standardised, computable formats. But computational tools are also 
needed to feed knowledge into the model. Luke searched scientific publications for combi-
nations of the hormones “cholecystokinin (CCK)” and its receptor “CCK1R” and of “gas-
trin (G-17)” and its receptor “CCK2R”, through PubMed and various literature-mining 
tools, e.g. LitInspector and iHOP (Tripathi et  al. 2015, 2). First-order biological knowl-
edge developed by training and practical experience with standard wet-lab work is cru-
cial for adequately curating data resources and for model building. More than 250 of circa 
1200 articles were selected as useful references, by Luke, because they contained what was 
deemed, by curator judgment call, as “good evidence” that the reported signalling event is 
mediated by the interaction of gastrin with its receptor, and provided sufficient signalling 
information allowing for linkage of a new model component to its upstream and/or down-
stream regulators and effectors (Tripathi et al. 2015, 2). 
Not any knowledge claim explicated in scientific text will do. References selected here 
were “extracted” by a team of five trained biologists from GABI and SEB who read the lit-
erature, and represented the information and facts explicated in this literature appropri-
ately via the CellDesigner platform. The five team members individually read and ranked 
claims in the final selection in terms of their confidence in these claims as “OK, DISCUS-
SION, INCORRECT”, and they further critically discussed how to represent reactions, 
components and cellular localisations through the software (cf. Tripathi et  al. 2015, 3). 
This scale of parallel curation is rather uncommon in large-scale biocuration, given how 
limited current resources for biocurators are. The protocol followed here is thus atypically 
rigorous and very much reliant on the biological expertise of the curators in adequately 
translating between explicated and computable knowledge.
. 
Figure 3
Collaborative model-construction on the PAYAO platform. On the left hand panel we see a coding 
of map “points” tagging model components that group members discussed: the tagsets used are ‘OK’ 
(green),‘DISCUSSION’ (yellow), ‘INCORRECT’ (red) and ‘IMPLEMENTED’ (blue). (Reproduced 
with permission, Tripathi et al. 2015, figure 1)
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2.5. KM as epistemically productive and practice-dependent
Sabina Leonelli (2014) argues that the prospects of fully automating and replacing the ca-
pacities of scientists to assess and interpret data are highly doubtful but that computational 
tools facilitate collaborative thinking among working teams of scientists (399-400). Col-
laborative model-construction by GABI and SEB members was indeed a crucial outcome 
of using the community-curation platform associated with CellDesigner, PAYAO (Figure 
3). Still, and though we agree with Leonelli that full automation is highly unlikely, these 
computational tools are not epistemically inert. 
Miles MacLeod and Nancy Nersessian have analysed building dynamic network 
models within Integrative Systems Biology as “modelling from the ground up” (2013). 
The model they focus on is similar to the CCKR model but with added work by en-
gineers to model these interactions dynamically. In their analysis, this type of mod-
el-building involves approximating the causal structure of a phenomenon by assembling 
existing information about its components—as opposed to generating the phenomenon 
from simpler theoretical rules. This approach can be theory “light”, following pragmatic 
constraints (see also Leonelli et  al. 2012). But in the case of MacLeod and Nersessian 
(2013), constructing such models involved engineers with no biological knowledge per-
forming similar literature searches as Luke did in our case. For example, describing the 
construction of dynamic models of such pathways by an engineer, MacLeod and Ner-
sessian (2013) say: “In each case, the pathway given to her by her collaborators was in-
sufficient given her modelling goals, and she was forced to pull in whatever pieces of in-
formation she could find from literature searches and databases about similar systems or 
the molecules involved, in order to generate a pathway that mapped the dominant dy-
namic elements” (541). Lacking an adequate knowledge about biology could mean that 
when selecting what references to include in a pathway model, all one can rely on is KM 
resources.
Further scientific inferences were made ‘automatically’ also in our case study. Once ex-
plicated biological knowledge was curated and represented in CellDesigner, the map was 
analysed using computational tools, in this case Cytoscape and the BiNoM plugin (Shan-
non et  al. 2003). Decomposing the map into sub-networks using a “pruning” software 
function “revealed” 18 modules that were “higher-level structures” of the signalling map 
(Tripathi et al. 2015). The software helped to analyse what happens in a cell stimulated by 
gastrin by isolating different signalling pathways linked to particular outcomes, like pro-
liferation, migration and apoptosis. And still further data, besides the explicated litera-
ture-curated and computationally analysed knowledge, was brought in to explore these in-
teractions. 
Large-scale Protein-Protein Interaction (PPI) data was downloaded from databases 
using the webservice Proteomics Standard Initiative Common QUery InterfaCe, PSIC-
QUIC. The selection was filtered using controlled vocabulary terms to just include binary 
physical interactions, and the data was added to the literature-based map, to enable the fur-
ther biological interpretation of the interactions represented there. Combining interaction 
data with topological network analysis, and using their biological expertise, GABI and SEB 
researchers identified seventy proteins, which “represent experimentally testable hypothe-
ses for gaining new knowledge on gastrin- and cholecystokinin receptor signalling” (Trip-
athi et al. 2015, 1). Seventy proteins may seem like a lot of proteins to ask biologists to run 
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individual experiments on, but in a field seeking to explore thousands of biological interac-
tions it is a small number. 
In sum, computer-based scientific KM enables sourcing, representing and analysing the 
biological literature and it informs hypotheses to test in the lab. Visual communication and 
representation practices are key both for information sharing and for building communal 
vision, especially in multi-disciplinary teams (Carusi 2011; Coopmans et  al. 2014). And 
they are epistemologically productive. A biologist may be capable of mentally picturing mo-
lecular interactions in small-scale models, but this is challenging for large-scale models. Pro-
cessing and depicting biological knowledge about molecular interactions through CellDe-
signer or Cytoscape transforms practices of network construction and analysis in biology. 
It develops the know-how of biologists as users of these tools, while transforming what was 
originally sourced as first-order knowledge explicated in the literature, into data of compu-
tational value, for the purposes of assembling and analysing this knowledge from a high-
er-level in a way that can feed it back into biological inquiry. 
This type of work is seen as especially crucial for the field of systems biology. The result 
is computationally accessible data (the model itself) and further explicated knowledge (the 
accompanying article). Note that the epistemic validity of KM-enabled systems biology 
still depends on experimental knowledge of biology: this informs first, creating KM infra-
structures through adequately aligning the standards, languages and structures required by 
computational tools with what gives meaning to working biologists, and second developing 
epistemically adequate protocols for using KM tools within biological research. 
3. Overcoming limitations of KM knowledge concepts and epistemologies 
Second-order scientific KM is transforming first-order biological knowledge practices. But 
there is a cost to these tools, we caution. The concepts enabling KM researchers to think of 
knowledge as possible to source, “extract” from the literature and to “assemble” and “dis-
tribute” in computational, semi-automated ways prime an understanding of knowledge 
as an objective object. Computational KM thus risks losing track of the context-sensitiv-
ity and contestability of scientific knowing unless practice-based biological knowledge is 
openly appreciated as intrinsic to the validity and validation of these tools. 
3.1. Scientific KM and collaborative labour
How will 21st century biology make appropriate use of ‘its’ knowledge? KM work mixes bi-
ological and computational expertise, at different levels of visibility and importance. Man-
ifestly biological knowledge is the key epistemic resource offered by network models. Yet 
this knowledge is already processed in computational formats: ‘marked’ and ‘marked-up’ as 
computer comprehensible. 
Kitano assumes that biological knowledge formatted in CellDesigner is possible to 
comprehend by biologists. But pointing to a space in a “knowledge assembly” model is not 
by default meaningful to a molecular biologist—at least not when compared to experimen-
tal observation. When asked about people’s responses to the CCKR model, Luke answers 
that people are sometimes “amused” (Interview, 31.5.12). Sometimes they find the model 
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“scary”: as “the very simplified” version of the pathways is the usual picture they have (In-
terview, 31.5.12). Luke adds:
Everyone knows that cell machinery is very complicated, that wiring inside the cell is very 
complicated. So people [molecular biologists] want to focus on their own domain [and say]: “If 
I’m working on this component why care about the rest?” (Interview, 31.5.12). 
The value of computationally founded knowledge of a cellular space is contrasted with the 
value of knowing components one is familiar with, experimentally. The vision of systems 
biology is that of knowing a whole system. But perhaps a “cellular signalling map” is fright-
ening for a molecular biologist who does not feel lost (or who is happy to work with tunnel 
vision)!
GABI member ‘Silja’ was trained in mathematics and computer science but 
switched to biology and biochemistry. Silja worked with mathematicians in the early 
days of microarray experiments to distinguish signal from noise. She recalls the real 
need for such tools, emphasising the risk of making computer scientists’ labour invisi-
ble in biology.
At first we were asking them to work for us, but then we had a project together.... I keep say-
ing: “If you need someone to work for you, you need an engineer”. But it is not possible to collab-
orate and keep asking them [bioinformaticians] to work for you—we cannot always be leading. 
They can be main authors, supervisors. (Interview, 10.10.12).
Silja was involved in extensive microarray time-series experiments, producing temporal 
data coveted by both experimentalists and computational biologists. GABI research with 
this data has shown that gastrin upregulates genes that may be involved in different phys-
iological processes, including tumorigenesis, proliferation, endoplasmic reticulum stress, 
anti-apoptosis, differentiation and migration. In our conversation Silja shared her future 
plans to use the data to further explore protein expression and cell fates in in vitro and in 
vivo models. 
Why not use the time-series results in silico, to develop KM tools? Silja reports that she 
was invited to reanalyze the data and “get more knowledge” together with SEB researchers. 
She adds:
But I am more interested in using the data. That is why I am now working with ‘Tanja’ and 
‘Hannah’ [biologists], trying to understand the data more… I like experimental (wet-lab) work as 
well, and I am not so eager about spending considerable more time on generating bioinformatics 
tools. (Interview, 10.10.12; emphasis added).
Silja juxtaposes “understanding the data” with using the data to get more “knowledge”. The 
term “knowledge” here specifies an outcome of computational processing, indicating that 
the founded concept is operating in the lab and also in the work of biologists. This “knowl-
edge” is contrasted in the next sentence with what, in Silja’s view, offers an “understand-
ing” of the data: “using” the data to do further experimental—wet lab—work. This could 
indicate a contrast between the founded knowledge that results from computational work 
with (really) understanding the data, through experimental molecular biology. And note 
also the shift in the labour dynamics here: at this moment in time, a biologist could also feel 
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that the ownership of her labour is at stake, as computational biologists are ‘using’ biologi-
cal data.7
It need not be that Silja is critical to KM development; simply the joy and familiar-
ity that experimental work provide may be what drive experimental biologists to continue 
their work. But it certainly seems that practices and values are not smoothly shared across 
computational and experimental domains, posing a choice: How can biology best manage 
its knowledge? Is computational KM enhancing or compromising traditional, first-order 
knowledge production? 
We reflect on these questions in the next section. Our suggestion is that KM may 
enhance first-order knowledge production if it embraces and acknowledges that prac-
tice-based epistemological approaches are part of its practice. 
3.2.  Organisational KM: Towards a practice-based epistemology for 
scientific KM
Donald Hislop’s account of organisational KM distinguishes two theories of knowledge 
(2013, Chapters 2 and 3). “Objectivist” epistemologies consider knowledge as an ob-
ject: some thing that can be separated from the knowers, codified, stored and trafficked, 
objectively. “Practice-based” epistemologies instead consider knowledge as embedded 
in and inseparable from people’s practices, bodies and cultures and as intrinsically so-
cial and negotiated. This overlaps with philosophical distinctions between ‘explicit’ and 
‘tacit’ knowledge (Polanyi 1967), and between propositional and non-propositional or 
embodied knowledge, what Gilbert Ryle called “knowing that” versus “knowing how” 
(Ryle 1949). The importance of practice-based knowledge is highlighted by history and 
philosophy of biology—most notably in Keller’s discussion of Barbara McClintock’s 
“feeling for” her corn plants (Keller 1983), but also specifically in the context of biocu-
ration (Leonelli 2014). Here we are interested in situating this distinction instead as a 
part of the theoretical tradition of organisational KM which is closer to our informants’ 
work practice. 
Life science KM, at its word, seems to imply an objectivist epistemology. According 
to Hislop (2013) objectivist epistemologies assume/enforce four claims: 1. knowledge is 
an object, 2. knowledge is objective, 3. explicit knowledge is better than tacit knowledge, 4. 
knowledge is cognitive (18-19). SEB members and their GABI partners involved in our 
study refer to knowledge as a thing, considered possible to separate from those who have 
it, to “extract”, codify and analyse it. Semantic web tools seem to promise ‘objectivity’ 
as knowledge is to be “disambiguated”, and thus possible to share among scientists be-
yond particular (idiosyncratic, subjective) terminologies, national/cultural contexts or 
work cultures. Assembling and representing explicated knowledge is seen as ‘presenting 
the facts’ and thus knowledge-assembly models can become synonymous to “maps” of ac-
tual cellular spaces. There is no doubt that biological knowledge and computer science 
knowledge can be tacit and that both are crucial for epistemically adequate KM. KM sci-
7 Different cultures of ownership among knowledge managers/informaticians and experimentalists are 
discussed by Bruno Strasser, e.g. 2011.
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entists would not deny this. Yet another type of knowledge takes the spotlight as valua-
ble here. 
Efforts are put into further ‘automating’ quality assessments, explicating and codifying 
practice-based knowledge via “evidence codes”, and other metadata, for biology experts to 
be able to “interpret” data into knowledge faster, using computational tools to help reason 
to an outcome which is considered cognitive as opposed to embodied. Overall, and despite 
the importance of experimentation, KM purports to be able to manage experimentally pro-
duced knowledge, “better”. 
What would KM look like instead from the perspective of a “practice-based episte-
mology”? Would a practice-based epistemology even be possible, given how KM tools have 
been developed? Practice-based epistemology highlights aspects of knowledge and knowing 
that are tacit and embodied, and that cohere with the values of feminist epistemology (e.g. 
Anderson 1995). In this view: 1. knowledge is a process, 2. Explicating knowledge is incom-
plete, 3. Knowledge is multidimensional, 4. Knowledge is socially produced, uncertain and 
political (Hislop 2013, 32-41). From this epistemological perspective, there can be many 
frames for understanding biological knowledge. First, biological knowledge could show up 
as embedded in biological practices, occurring in on-going human-non-human laboratory 
activities whereby knowing and doing are hard to dichotomise, and where objects and clas-
sifications are made and remade depending on the interests at hand (cf. Dupré 1993). In 
this approach, KM tool creation would need to be seen as intrinsically revise-able, and du-
rational, if not using process-based ontologies. Further, a practice-based epistemology chal-
lenges the assumption that biological knowledge can be fully explicated and codified, im-
plying that knowledge possible to manage via current computational KM tools would be by 
default incomplete. Following a practice-based epistemology, developing KM tools involves 
inherently ambiguity, uncertainty, and the exercise of judgement on the part of those pur-
suing knowledge –professionals as well as the technologies they relegate decisions to. Third, 
in this view, knowledge is multidimensional both embodied and intellectual, tacit and ex-
plicit, collective and individual, developing and static. Managing to ‘know’ biology within 
biological institutions would need to recognise the multiple expressions, “ambiguity”, and 
inconsistencies, also as part of getting better knowledge. Fourth, a practice-based under-
standing of knowledge views it as socially constituted, pursued in communities and varying 
across disciplinary and national cultures for legitimate, indeed unavoidable, reasons. Na-
tional and cultural factors impact how biological knowledge is developed, on what topics, 
for how much funding, with what expectations, on whose bodies. In this frame, knowl-
edge is visible as political, meaning that differentiations between knowing and not knowing 
groups or people, humans and nonhumans, come with polarisation, inequalities, conflict 
and negotiations of power. 
As already stated, our material indicates that knowledge practices within current com-
putational KM rely on objectivist epistemologies: understanding knowledge as cognitive, 
and objective and of added value when explicated. But perhaps KM need not operate with 
this view. The work of experimentalists, and biocurators to produce KM knowledge struc-
tures is very much embodied and situated and intrinsic to the quality assurance of KM uti-
lisation protocols. In our case, Luke’s and his four collaborators’ labour to read and rank 
literature claims was intrinsic in sourcing “well-evidenced” ”knowledge’ to be further, 
semi-automatically, managed. Computational KM practices could openly appreciate them-
selves as part of an ecology of knowing that intrinsically involves practice-based, biological 
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knowing and experimentation in its uncertainty, corporeality and context. In this frame, 
collaborations between experimental and computational biologists would become an essen-
tial lifeline and quality assurer for KM, which could in return help manage knowledge bet-
ter (Figure 4).
 
Figure 4
Drawing developed by SEB members to represent the semantic systems biology 
work-cycle (Left). Semantic systems biology operates on knowledge extracted from literature 
and databases, processing it computationally to develop new hypotheses that can be tested 
in biological experimental practice (Left). Our analysis here flags the ‘yin’ in the ‘yang’, and 
‘yang’ in the ‘yin’ for this work to be properly balanced (right): practice-based knowledge is 
needed to support computational conclusions -- theoretical work is also operative in facilitating 
experimental work.  
[Reproduced from Kuiper’s presentation slides; see also figure 2 Antezana et al. 2009, 401.]
Conclusion 
We have argued for one main point in this article. Computationally enabled knowl-
edge management practices offer second-order scientific ways to derive new, first-order 
biological knowledge. We specified two founded concepts of knowledge enabling this 
work: a. knowledge conceived as facts and information explicated in published scien-
tific texts, and b. knowledge conceived as computable via appropriately derived data and 
metadata. KM practices help transform biological knowledge into explicated knowl-
edge with computational value, for instance structured as “signalling networks” that 
enable novel clustering and other graph analysis operations. This knowledge, though 
manageable, seems remote from traditional experimental knowing, but it should not. 
Experimental expertise, practice-based knowing though processual, uncertain, embod-
ied and contestable are intrinsic to securing the validity of manageable knowledge as 
knowledge. 
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Jim Grey, researcher and software designer in IBM and Microsoft, infamously heralded 
a new, “fourth paradigm” for scientific research: following theory-based, experiment-based 
and computation-based science we were entering an informatics-based science—a simplis-
tic but powerful statement (Hey et al. 2009, xviii). Karl Popper, a man of clear physicalist 
and materialist persuasion also considered the move from ‘subjective’ knowledge to pub-
lished theories in libraries as an evolutionary step in human development (1972). Yet he ar-
gued that the growth of knowledge must be in principle unpredictable: If one could predict 
how knowledge would grow and obtain the knowledge of tomorrow today, there would be 
no more growth to it (Popper 1972, 296-300). Perhaps then, KM visions such as those that 
Jim Gray pose for 21st century knowledge can be seen in these terms: automating scientific 
knowledge discovery were it to be possible would run the risk of killing—or at least stunt-
ing the growth—of knowledge. 
To finish with the poetry of a.rawlings (2006, 42): 
specify comma, question mark? dissect comma? intersect question mark, comma?
Collect, sort and frame text. 
How does a text fall asleep?
Pinch meaning between morpheme and phoneme. 
How does text eat itself?
Slide meaning into envelope; store in box with semanticide.
comma, question mark specimen? comma dissection? question mark, comma cross-section?
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